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I know nothing of the facts, but policemen under the law, 
by the opinion of all the courts have the right to exercise 
such force as may be necessary to preserve the law, and 
the court says that their actions in those matters a re not 
weighed on golden scales, that they must use such force 
as they think necessary. 
Senator Josiah Bailey 
I do not think that a policeman has the right to kill a man 
in the exercise of riot duty . . . . 
Philip Murray 
On March 2, 1937, the world ©f big business was stunned when United 
States Steel, one of the formulators of the "open shop" labor policy, 
announced the signing of a contract with the Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee (SWOC), an affiliate of the Committee for Industrial Organization 
(CIO). 
Looking back on this agreement some years later, Tom Girdler, the 
head of Republic Steel, admitted that he had been "bitter about t h i s . " He 
believed that his feelings had been shared by the "vast majority of the steel 
men of the nation . . . we were convinced that a surrender to the CIO was a 
bad thing for our companies, for our employees, indeed for the United States 
of America. " The employees, however, were not convinced that organiza-
tion was a "bad thing. " In the weeks that followed the announcement of the 
U.S. Steel contract, 20,000 workers joined SWOC and thirty steel compa-
nies, large and small, agreed to collective bargaining. 
The fourth-largest steel producer in the nation, the Jones and Laugh -
lin Steel Corporation, which had opposed unions even more firmly than had 
U. S. Steel, was forced by a thirty-six hour strike to submit to a National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) poll of its employees. The workers voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of CIO affiliation: 17,028 for SWOC, and 7,207 
against it. Subsequently, the Sharon and the Pittsburgh steel companies 
tested the strength of the union in NLRB plebiscites. Again the workers 
voted overwhelmingly for SWOC. 
Only six companies of importance refused to sign: Bethlehem Steel. 
Republic Steel, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Inland Steel, National Steel and 
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American Rolling Mills. Known as "Little Steel," these many-sided, multi-
million-dollar corporations were little only in comparison to such monoliths 
as U.S. Steel. Under the leadership of Tom Girdler, the Little Steel com-
panies refused to enter into written contracts of any type withSWOC. Indic-
ative of their position is this exchange before an inquiring Senate Committee: 
Senator Green: Then as I understand it, you would deal 
with the CIO, and you would have collec-
tive bargaining . . . , but you would not 
have a contract with the CIO? 
Mr. Girdler: I think you have stated it all right. 3 
S. K. Ratcliffe, describing the "Labor War in America" for the readers of 
The Spectator, wrote that "the campaign on the employer's side is directed 
mainly by Mr. Tom Girdler, president of the Republic Company, who would 
not object to being described as a die-hard champion of the old order. "^ 
SWOC, faced at best with a stalemate because of the employers' 
refusal to bargain toward a written contract, called out its members in four 
of the Little Steel companies in late May and early June, 1937. There were 
strikes in the plants and mills of Republic, Youngstown, Inland and the 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, unit of Bethlehem. In the ensuing weeks, intimi-
dation, disorder and violence seemed to be standard operating procedure. 
Literally scores of men were injured, and eighteen deaths were recorded. 
Ten of these occurred May 30 — Memorial Day— on Chicago's South Side. 
In addition to the ten fatally wounded, ninety were injured, some so se r i -
ously as to be permanently disabled. 
In trying to ascertain what happened Memorial Day in Chicago, the La 
Follette "Civil Liberties" subcommittee of the Senate Education and Labor 
Committee concluded that but for the actions of the police in refusing to 
allow the str ikers to parade en masse before the gates of the Republic plant, 
"the day would have passed without violence or disorder . . . . " 5 The sub-
committee report also concluded that if the determination of the police to 
halt the parade had been justified, "proper police work clearly required 
careful preparation to accomplish this . . . with a minimum of violence, yet 
no one [on the police force] gave real consideration to the tactics of the 
occasion."6 Finally, the report held that it was plain "that the force 
employed by the police was far in excess of that which the occasion 
required."? 
The Cook County coroner's inquest, the only other official investiga-
tion of the incident conducted, arrived at a different set of conclusions. The 
inquest found that the incident "started when 1500-2000 persons, many of 
whom were carrying clubs or missiles, attempted to force their way through 
a police line intending to enter the plant." The coroner's jury "from the 
testimony . . . found the occurrence to be justifiable homicide. " 8 
Neither of these two conclusions is absolutely correct. Both suffer 
from bias: the La Follette committee had pro-labor sympathies; the coro-
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ner ' s jury had an interest in exonerating the police. However, the conclu-
sions of the Senate report generally hold up under scrutiny, but the verdicts 
of the coroner's jury do not. If the conclusions of the Senate report are 
examined, one can determine from the available evidence approximately 
what did happen. 
i 
The strike call had been issued at Republic's Chicago plant on May 26. 
Four days later, Earl Handley, Otis Jones, Kenneth Reed, Lee Tisdale, 
Anthony Tagliori, Hilding Anderson, Alfred Causey, Leon Francisco, Sam 
Popovitch and Joe Rothmunc all had sustained fatal injuries during an 
attempt by the union to establish mass picketing and to parade before the 
gates of the plant. 9 
The hierarchy of police officials concerned with the strike in Chicago, 
when testifying before the La Follette committee, seemed to be slightly con-
fused and vague on the question of picketing, frustration of which had led to 
unruly demonstrations and had finally brought on the mass parade and its 
ensuing bloodshed. Police Commissioner James Allman; Captain John Pen-
dergast, chief of the uniformed force; Captain John Mooney, commander of 
the second division; and Captain Thomas Kilroy, in charge of the ninth dis-
trict (where the plant was located), did not seem to be able to agree with 
each other. When questioned by Senator Robert La Follette, J r . , about 
whether any trouble had been anticipated from picketing during the strike 
and whether measures had been taken to prevent disorder, Commissioner 
Allman replied that he had ordered "the necessary details to preserve the 
peace and protect life and property. " 1 0 The following interchange between 
the senator and the commissioner shows that the latter had done little 
else: 
Senator La Follette: These were the only instructions that 
you issued at any time till Memorial 
Day? 
Mr. Allman: That is all. n 
When asked about the number of pickets allowed, the commissioner replied 
to Senator Elbert Thomas that in a conference with the union leaders he had 
told them: " 'I don't care how many you have. ' There was no question with 
me, sir, as to the number, it was the peacefulness of the pickets that 
counted. "12 
Captain Pendergast, who also had attended this conference, generally 
substantiated the commissioner's testimony. But Captain Mooney, who had 
been in charge at the plant, told a different story. 
Senator La Follette: You understood that [Allman] fixed 
the number of pickets at 100? 
Mr. Mooney: I understood that, yes. 
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Senator La Follette: You didn't understand that he had 
said they could have as many as they 
wanted? 
Mr. Mooney: I didn't understand that, n o . 1 S 
The place of picketing and the number of pickets allowed thus had become 
mainly dependent upon the judgment of the commanding police officers at 
the plant, despite a ruling of the Chicago corporation counsel, which had 
been sent to all police districts, that "peaceful picketing" was legal. ^ 
The Republic corporation had decided to continue operating with those 
of its employees who had not gone on strike. From the first hours of the 
strike, union attempts to picket these men in any numbers were blocked. 
On Wednesday, May 26, when a crowd outside the plant grew to several 
hundred and was augmented by a sound truck from which a union organizer 
attempted to set up a picket line, the police forcibly cleared the streets. 
Forty of the strikers and sympathizers were arrested and charged with 
unlawful assembly and disorderly conduct. That same evening, Captain 
Pendergast had issued orders establishing three shifts of policemen at the 
plant under the command of Captain Mooney. Each shift consisted of ninety 
men, four sergeants and two lieutenants. A reserve detail of thirty-eight 
policemen would be set up three days l a t e r . 1 5 
The disturbances of Wednesday evening were followed by similar out-
breaks Thursday and Friday. The strikers read in the newspapers Mayor 
Kelly's statement that peaceful picketing was lawful and would be permitted, 
but every effort to establish a mass picket line was frustrated. On Friday, 
shots were fired by the police when approximately 1, 000 strikers sought to 
march and establish themselves before the plant. Twenty-six str ikers and 
policemen were injured. Finally, on Saturday, May 29, the police allowed 
limited picketing before the plant for the first t i m e . 1 6 
The area in which all this took place, about 300 acres in size, 
is a stretch of flat, waste, sparsely inhabited prairie land 
east of and adjacent to the South Chicago plant of the steel 
corporation at Burley Avenue and 116th to 118th Streets. 
The plant itself is bounded on the west by the Calumet 
River, on the north by steel scrap piles, on the south by 
low prairie land, on the east by a barb-wire [sic] topped 
fence and the tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The 
main entrance to the plant is a 25-foot gate at 118th Street 
and Burley Avenue. The fence is pierced near its north-
ern end by a gate for the passage of railroad cars . . . . 
To the east and north of the plant are flat fields, unculti-
vated except for a few small houses, taverns, and stores 
at its northern and southern extremities. . . . Strike 
headquarters . . . [were] located in a former tavern known 
as Sam's Place, at Greenbay Avenue and__113th Street, 
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one block east and five blocks north of the plant gate 
.
1 7 
It was at "Sam's Place" that the union held a mass protest meeting on Sun-
day — Memorial Day — May 30, 1937. 
This union meeting served as a major point of contention between 
str ikers and police. The latter maintained that the leaders of the union had 
planned to take an armed band organized at T,Sam!s Place" into the steel 
plant and drive out those workers who had not gone out on strike. The union 
leaders categorically denied this. They insisted that the meeting had been 
a peaceful protest, that a resolution had been passed to establish a picket 
line in front of the plant and that in carrying out this resolution the str ikers 
and their friends had banded together and paraded toward the plant to be 
met with unbelievably brutal violence by the police. In general, both sides 
agreed that the marchers paraded down Greenbay Avenue from "Sam's 
Place," swung across to the dirt road which diagonally bisected the prairie, 
reached the police line and spread out so that the unionists were facing the 
police along the full length of the lat ter 's lines. However, they agreed on 
little else: the organization of the marchers, the conduct of the marchers 
and the police and the ensuing violence were contested bitterly. 
It is almost impossible to accept the union's premise that the parade 
was a spontaneous demonstration by the crowd. There is too much evidence 
to the contrary, including the use of stick-handled placards bearing appro-
priate slogans. Moreover, the union must have expected some trouble, for 
union members had placed crude red cross signs in their automobiles and a 
union physician, Dr. Lawrence Jacques, was present and ready to give med-
ical aid. Thus, there can be no doubt that some form of direct action fol-
lowing the meeting was anticipated. What is uncertain is whether the union 
leaders intended "to force" an entry into the plant. According to their t e s -
timony, the union supporters did not want trouble. Anton Goldasic, a steel 
worker, told the La Follette committee that "if the people inside saw the 
majority on the outside and that they were marching for the CIO, I figured 
that they would come out and join u s . " 1 8 Almost twenty per cent of the 
crowd was familiar with the size of the plant police force and with the tem-
per of the sizable group of loyal employees still in the plant, many of whom 
strongly opposed unionization. It is hard to believe that the union leaders 
were unaware of all these mitigating factors and that they would not come to 
the same conclusion as Commissioner Allman, who said, "It would have 
been . . . simply . . . a massacre if they got inside . . . . " 1 9 
Captain Mooney asserted that he had been "tipped off" that the march-
ers expected to "capture" the plant and stage a sitdown. His actions and 
those of Captain Kilroy were based on that assumption, he later declared. 
When asked by Senator La Follette about the sources of his information, he 
replied: 
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Mr. Mooney: I got it from three or four different 
sources. 
Senator La Follette: Can you tell us some of them, one of 
them? 
Mr. Mooney: Well, I got it from some newspaper-
men. They didn't give me their 
n a m e s . 2 0 
Beyond making these nebulous statements, the captain could not enlighten 
the senators as to his anonymous sources except to add that "it was com-
mon knowledge among a great many people that they were going to march on 
the plant Sunday, May 30th. " 2 1 Captain Kilroy, when questioned, did not 
shed much more light on the issue: 
Senator La Follette: Well, how did you know what the 
objective of the marchers was? 
Mr. Kilroy: Just my judgement. 2 2 
It was on such judgment and information that the police captains decided to 
halt the parade two blocks from the plant. 
THE MARCH: The strikers move across the prairie toward the Republic 
plant as Chicago police block their path. (Wide World Photos. ) 
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THE CLASH: This is a frame from the newsreel shown at the senate hear-
ing which investigated the strike. (Wide World Photos. ) 
ii 
When informed of the imminence of a march, the police had spread 
out in formation eastward along 117th Street so that they faced the strikers 
as they marched along the zig-zagging dirt road. The march had started a 
few minutes after 4:00 p .m. At approximately 4:30 p . m . , as the strikers 
were crossing the field, the police moved their line up to 116th Street. This 
movement bunched the policemen closer together. What happened in the 
next ten minutes on the prairie was recorded in an almost continuous 
sequence by Orlando Lippert, a Paramount Newsreel cinematographer.2^ 
A word picture of the newsreel describes what happened. 
The first scenes show police drawn up in a long line 
across a dirt road which runs diagonally through a large 
open field [the prairie] . . . . The police line extends 
about forty or fifty yards on each side of the dirt road 
[ i . e . , about 116th Street]. Behind the lines and in the 
street beyond, nearer the mill are several patrol wagons 
. . . and reserve guards of police. Straggling along 
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across the field is a long irregular line, headed by two 
men carrying American flags. . . . Many carry placards 
. . . the head of the parade [is] . , . halted at the police 
line. The flag bearers are in front. Behind them the pla-
cards are massed. . . . Between the flagbearers is the 
marchersT spokesman, a muscular young man in shirt 
sleeves with a CIO button on the band of his felt hat. He 
is arguing earnestly with the police officer [Captain Kil-
roy] who appears to be in command. His vigorous ges-
tures indicate that he is insisting on permission to con-
tinue through the police line. . . . His expression is s e r i -
ous but no suggestion of threat or violence is apparent. 
The police officer whose back is to the camera makes one 
impatient gesture of refusal . . . . 2 ^ 
The participants told conflicting versions of what was passing between 
marchers and police at this time. 
Captain Mooney, fearing trouble, had increased the force of police in 
the area. He had ordered the 4-to-12 shift to report at 3:00 p .m. and the 
day shift to remain on duty. Accordingly, 264 policemen were available to 
the captains that afternoon. 
Questioning by the senators revealed that Captain Kilroy and Captain 
Mooney had separated, each speaking to a group of men, commanding them 
to disperse peacefully Min the name of the law. n Both testified that they had 
been answered by threats and profanity, but. if so, these came from the 
rear echelons of the marchers, for all the testimony not given by police 
asserted the contrary. Ralph Beck, a reporter assigned to the scene by the 
Chicago Daily News, was standing by Captain Kilroy; he testified that he 
had not heard any of those in the front ranks of the marchers threaten the 
police. The flag bearers declared the same. Although the photographic 
evidence (news photos and the newsreel) is not conclusive, it is significant 
in bearing out their statements. 
There is, at most, a lapse of a few seconds in the newsreel because 
of a change of lens. Before the change the strikers are seen talking to the 
police; after the change pandemonium is the scene. The start of the 
encounter was swift and seemed to have been telescoped into this extremely 
brief period of time. James Stewart, one of the forward placard bearers, 
testified that one second he was talking to the police, and the next, "the 
policeman right in front of me swung his baton on me . " 2 5 John Lotitio, one 
of the flag bearers , also claimed that the crowd was orderly and that "the 
first thing I knew I got clubbed, while I was talking . . . . "26 
There is no orderly sequence of events, and no inquiry was able to 
establish one. Each observer was limited in vision to the occurrences 
immediately about him. Beck and John Pur dis, an AP photographer, test i-
fied that a branch of a tree was thrown from the rear over the front ranks 
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of the s tr ikers at the police. The first shots followed the throwing of the 
branch; each side claimed that the other fired the shots, but there was no 
agreement between any two witnesses as to precisely where they came 
from. ^ 7 Tear gas was brought into use, but in some sections of the line 
showers of rocks bombarded the police before it could be used. In other 
sections, the tear gas was used and then followed by retaliatory missiles 
from the s t r ikers . At almost the same time the police rushed the str ikers, 
clubbing and firing. The newsreel camera catches approximately 
a dozen marchers falling simultaneously into a heap. The 
massive sustained roar of the police pistols lasts on the 
sound track perhaps two or three seconds. 
. . . the police charge on the marchers with riot 
sticks flailing. At the same time tear gas grenades are 
seen sailing into the mass of the demonstrators and clouds 
of gas r ise over them. Most of the crowd is now seen to 
be in flight. 
. . . a number of individuals either through foolish 
hardihood or because they have not realized what is in 
progress around them remained behind . . . groups of 
policemen close in on these individuals and go to work on 
them with their clubs, hi several instances from two to 
four men are seen beating one man. 
On the front line during the parley with the police is 
a female [Mrs. Lupe Marshall] not more than five feet 
tall . . . . Under one arm she is carrying a purse and 
some newspapers. After . . . the shots she turns to find 
that her path is blocked by a heap of fallen men. She 
stumbles over them . . . then she is seen going down 
under a . . . blow from a policeman's club . . . . She 
gets up, and staggers around. A few minutes later she is 
shown being shoved into a patrol wagon, blood cascading 
down her face and spreading over her clothing . . . . 
The camera shifts to the patrol wagons in the rear; 
men with bloody heads are being loaded in. One, who has 
apparently been shot in the leg, drags himself . . . into 
the picture with the aid of two policemen. An elderly man 
. . . holding one hand to the back of his head clambers 
painfully up the steps of a patrol wagon and slumps . . . . 
Far off toward the outer corner of the field, where 
they [the marchers] came from originally, the marchers 
are still in flight, with an irregular line of police seen in 
close pursuit, clubbing . .
 fc .28 
It is extremely hard to reconcile the conduct of the police with any 
sense of democratic decenc}^ or morality. The Senate report concluded that 
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Mwounded prisoners of war might have expected and received greater solic-
itude. " 2^ Witness after witness and report after report testified to the cal-
lousness and indifference of the police. The wounded were piled high on top 
of one another in patrol wagons made to hold only one injured man. Mrs. 
Marshall testified that "there were some men who had their heads under-
neath others; some had their arms all twisted up and their legs twisted up, 
until the police had filled the wagon up . . . and they shut the door. n 3 ^ The 
Reverend Mr. Charles B. Fisk, who was there at the request of the CIO, 
was arrested and "taken for a ride.,T He recalled later that "the first patrol 
wagon was so full of wounded persons that I could not even get into it. Then 
I was taken . . . to this police wagon, which was also full, and I was put 
into it ."31 When three policemen had been hurt on Friday, the department 
had put in a call for Fire Department ambulances. This was not done on 
Sunday. 
The completeness of the medical testimony also gives the lie to much 
of what the police maintained. Dr. Jacques classified the wounds as front, 
back and side. Of the total of forty injured by gun shots he estimated that 
"10% received front wounds, 22.5% received side wounds, and 67.5% 
received back wounds. "32 This general diagnostic ratio was later con-
firmed, though reluctantly, at the coroner1 s inquest for the ten dead. As a 
union spokesman pointed out, if the marchers charged the police, they must 
have charged them backside first. 
Altogether, ten marchers were killed, ninety injured. Thirty of the 
injured were gunshot-wound cases. Thirty-eight others received lacera-
tions and contusions requiring hospitalization. The rest of the injured 
marchers were ambulatory cases requiring treatment. About fifteen per 
cent of these were permanently disabled. Thirty-five policemen sustained 
injuries requiring treatment; only three were hospitalized. The majority of 
the police injuries seem to have been incurred during the course of the 
encounter and were not inflicted by anybody among the marchers. Police 
accident reports of some instances confirm this: 
While breaking up an unpermitted parade, participant 
tripped causing contusions of the knuckles and palm. 
While dispatching reserves to the scene of the riot, 
left leg was caught in middle upright of the main gate. ^ 
F. Raymond Daniell of the New York Times, visiting the scene of the 
incident three days later, reported meeting "one policeman wearing a belt 
containing fifty . 45 caliber bullets [and saw him] take a box of cartridges 
from his pocket and say to this correspondent, 'We're ready for them, and 
boy am I eager.' "34 Harry Harper, who was on the prair ie that day merely 
attempting to get through to see his brother (who was at work in the plant) 
and who had his left eye clubbed out, asked of no one in particular during 
his testimony before the La Follette committee whether the police that day 
had forgotten the Sixth Commandment — Thou shalt not kill. 35 
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Memorial Day in Chicago settled nothing. There as elsewhere the 
strike dragged on. Violence, disorder, unrest, loss of life accompanied it. 
In all the communities in the five states affected by the steel labor walkout 
the violent pattern of Chicago repeated itself. Before the strike ended eight 
more persons died. In Ohio the governor called out the National Guard, the 
steel mills were reopened and Guardsmen protected the few employees who 
wished to return to work as well as the strike breakers imported to crush 
the union. In Monroe, Michigan, the mayor called for civilians with mil i-
tary experience to enlist as special policemen and help break through what 
he called nthe illegal picket l ine . f , 3 e Many of Republic's mills and plants 
had been under virtual siege as SWOC attempted to keep them from operat-
ing; Girdler, employing a variety of means, frustrated the union's attempts. 
For example, when the Roosevelt administration squelched his attempt to 
send food and clothes through the mails across the picket lines to his 
employees, he bought four airplanes and started an airlift. 3? Not even a 
Federal Mediation Board — appointed by the president in the hope that some 
THE VICTIMS: Wounded str ikers await removal in police patrol wagons. 
(Wide World Photos.) 
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kind of compromise might bring a quick end to the industrial strife — could 
sway Girdler. Peaceful settlement proved unobtainable. Girdler spoke for 
all Little Steel when he candidly declared to both the board and to a senate 
committee investigating the strike that he would not sign with SWOC. He 
declared he believed it necessary for the proper operation of his company 
that it must be in a position to meet the fluctuations of the market unfet-
tered by a contract with the union.3 8 The board condemned this position 
but Girdler and the other leaders of Little Steel remained unmoved. 
The strike was broken. Early in July, 1937, the union called upon its 
members to return to work. This admission of defeat prompted the labor 
editor of the New York Times, a newsman who had not been unfriendly to 
the CIO, to ask, "Are Lewis and the CIO on the downgrade?"39 The vio-
lence in Chicago in particular as well as the CIOTs actions in general during 
the steel strike had not found favor with the public. An outcry had been 
raised against the CIO, one so strong that it threatened to stop the group1 s 
momentum completely. Mass action such as that undertaken in Chicago had 
been the order of the day for the militant organizers of the CIO. Similar 
tactics had proved successful in breaking other open shop citadels. This 
kind of pressure during the General Motors strikes from December, 1936, 
to March, 1937, had forced that corporation to negotiate with its workers. 
Likewise rubber, electrical and mine workers engaging in mass action had 
won new rights for themselves. But the general expressions of disapproval 
of CIO militancy which took place during the steel strike caused the union's 
leaders to reconsider their position on mass action. Certainly they had not 
expected the hostile attitude displayed toward the steel str ikers even after 
the events of Memorial Day in Chicago. A speech by Congressman E. E. 
Cox of Georgia attacking the CIO and accusing it of terrorizing industry was 
heartily cheered and applauded by many House members. 40 Public opinion 
turned against the Chicago steel workers. The beliefs of many were 
expressed by the businessman who admitted the excessive brutality used by 
the Chicago police to disperse the marchers but who nonetheless asserted 
that "the str ikers went out there for trouble and they got i t . . . . " 4 1 Lewis 
and the other leaders of the CIO, whatever they may have said publicly at 
the time, could not ignore such feelings, especially as the publicTs obvi-
ously hostile attitude caused the federal government to waver in its sup-
por t . 4 2 
Once the strike ended, SWOC as well as some of the other CIO unions 
heeded the lessons of the Memorial Day massacre and the steel strike, 
purged the more militant organizers and tried as well to discourage exces-
sive militancy by impulsive rank and f i l e r s . 4 3 New, less direct methods 
were employed as the CIO shifted the major emphasis from mass action to 
legal maneuvers. Attempts were made to remove the conflicts between 
union and management from the picket line to the hearing room of the 
NLRB. Utilization of these methods ultimately brought the steel workers 
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the victory denied them in 1937. In 1942 the Supreme Court upheld an 
NLRB ruling which forced Little Steel to bargain collectively. By the end 
of 1943 almost every company in the fabric steel industry in the United 
States was unionized. 
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